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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Did the district court err in dismissing the pH, BOD, and
TSS counts as moot for not constituting violations as required to maintain a section 505 citizen suit under the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365 (1982)?

II. Did the district court err in failing to rule on the validity
of the 1987 NPDES permit toxicity limitation due to lack
of jurisdiction?Iii
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States District Court for the
District of New Union (No. 86-631) has not been officially reported. The opinion of the district court appears on pages 913 of the record.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdictional statement has been omitted pursuant
9
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to Rule 4(c) of the 1988 Rules of the National Environmental
Law Moot Court Competition and Litigation Workshop.
STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND OTHER AUTHORITIES INVOLVED
The statutes, regulations, and other authorities relevant
to the determination of this case are reprinted in full or in
pertinent part in the Appendices.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Statement of the Facts.
Acme operates an organic chemical manufacturing plant
in New Union ("New Union" or the "State") and since 1974
has discharged waste into the Fairwater River under National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits
issued by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(the "EPA") pursuant to section 402 of the Clean Water Act
(the "Act"), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (R. 4). Under section 401 of
the Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341, New Union certified the 1974 permit limitations as essential toI 2 meet state water quality standards for sport fishing, boating, and swimming (R. 3). The
certified pH, Biological Oxygen Demand ("BOD"), and Total
Suspended Solids ("TSS") limits were more stringent than
otherwise would have been required under § 301(b)(1)(A) of
the Act (R. 3, 4).
The 1974 permit required Acme to meet the discharge
limits by July 1, 1977 (R. 3). Although Acme installed a required wastewater treatment plant before that date, the facility never achieved 100 percent compliance with the BOD and
TSS limitations (R. 6, 7). After installing automated treatment equipment in June, 1985, Acme violated its pH limitation only once. That violation, however, was the result of a
six-hour power outage (R. 6, 7).
In July 1987, the EPA issued a new permit in which New
Union certified less stringent BOD and TSS limitations (R. 4).
By 1987, discharges along Fairwater River had declined (R. 5).
New Union therefore determined that less stringent discharge
limits were consistent with its water quality standards for the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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river. Acme's 1987 permit conditions are consistent with these
standards (R. 5). Acme's performance continually improved
and, by August 1986, it achieved discharges below the subsequently established 1987 permit limits (R. 8). Acme consistently has met its 1987 permit limits except during two-week
periods each winter in which extreme cold curtails treatment
system biological activity (R. 8). The National Council for the
Protection of the Environment ("NCPE") has_2 challenged
the BOD and TSS limits in proceedings now pending before
the EPA (R. 6).
Acting on New Union's section 401 certification, the EPA
added a toxicity effluent limitation to Acme's 1987 NPDES
permit (R. 4). The New Union Department of Environmental
Protection (the "Department") developed the toxicity limitation to implement New Union's narrative water quality standard (R. 4). Undisputed Discharge Monitoring Reports
("DMRs") filed by Acme with the EPA disclose that Acme
violated the toxicity limitation in each of twelve monthly tests
performed since the issuance of the 1974 permit (R. 9, 12).
Acme challenged the toxicity portion of the certification
in a New Union court on procedural and vagueness grounds
(R. 4, 5). The court dismissed Acme's challenge for lack of jurisdiction (R. 5). Acme's subsequent challenge to the toxicity
effluent limitation is pending before the EPA (R. 6).

II. Proceedings Below.
Acme moved for summary judgment on the pH, BOD,
and TSS counts (R. 2, 10, 11). Acme urged that NCPE's suit
was moot because the company had come into compliance
with its 1987 permit (R. 9, 10). New Union joined Acme's motion on the grounds that post-compliance citizen suits intrude
upon the State's enforcement role (R. 10). The district court
granted the Acme-New Union motion and concluded that the
pH, BOD, and TSS violations were moot because they were
wholly past (R. 11). These violations, therefore, could not
serve as the basisJ! for a section 505 citizen suit (R. 11). Regarding NCPE's challenge to the 1987 BOD and TSS limits,
the district court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section
11
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509 of the Act and 40 C.F.R. Part 124 (R. 11).
The district court granted NCPE's motion for partial
summary judgment that Acme has consistently violated the
toxicity effluent limitation in its 1987 permit (R. 2, 12). New
Union joined NCPE in opposing on jurisdictional grounds
Acme's challenge to the toxicity limitation's validity (R. 12).
NCPE and New Union also maintained that the EPA independently must apply New Union's water quality standards as
required by 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (R. 12). New Union
further maintained that the toxicity limitation is valid and
that the water quality standard is not vague (R. 12). The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction under section 509 of
the Act (R. 12). In addition, the court held that absent EPA
action on Acme's pending permit appeal, the toxicity effluent
limitation remains effective and enforceable (R. 12).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court has held that citizens cannot sue for
wholly past violations under section 505 of the Clean Water
Act. Congress intended section 505 citizen suits to supplement, not supplant, normal state and EPA enforcement. Accordingly, the Court has interpreted the role of citizen-plaintiffs narrowly to avoid interference with states' primary
enforcement authority. Further, federalism, administrative,
and_2 judicial efficiency considerations support limitations on
the scope of citizen suits. Acme is not in violation of the pH,
BOD, or TSS limits in its current NPDES permit. NCPE's
challenge to the BOD and TSS limitations lacks merit, and
nevertheless, is currently before the EPA. To allow a citizen
suit based on the prospective outcome of that challenge would
denigrate the purposes of the citizen suit provision. NCPE has
failed to demonstrate continuous or intermittent violations of
the pH, BOD, and TSS limitations. The abatement-oriented
goal of the citizen suit provision and traditional mootness
principles dictate dismissal when continuous or intermittent
violations are not shown. Thus, the district court properly
granted Acme's summary judgment motion as to the pH,
BOD, and TSS counts.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the statutory scheme for administration of the Act support the district court's dismissal of
Acme's claim. The court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction
to review the EPA's decision on that challenge. Challenges to
New Union's certification should be heard by the courts of
New Union, and the district court properly abstained from
entering the sensitive areas of state social policy implicated by
Acme's claim. Acme's DMRs are undisputed and constitute
admissions for summary judgment purposes. Pending administrative review of Acme's permit challenge and possible subsequent judicial review, the current toxicity limitation is binding_2 and enforceable. The district court therefore correctly
refused to hear Acme's permit challenge.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED
THE COUNTS ALLEGING pH, BOD, AND TSS VIOLATIONS AS MOOT ON GROUNDS THAT THOSE
VIOLATIONS ARE NOT CONTINUING VIOLATIONS
AS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN A CITIZEN SUIT
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT.

The district court correctly granted Acme's motion for
summary judgment dismissing the pH, BOD, and TSS counts.
The court's decision is consistent with sound public policy,
the Congressional intent underlying the Clean Water Act, the
Act's enforcement scheme, and the United States Supreme
Court's recent holding in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation,Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 383 (1987).
A.

The district court decision dismissing the pH, BOD,
and TSS counts is consistent with the intent of Congress in enacting §505 and with sound public policy
considerations.

The decision below is consistent with (1) the Congressional intent to limit a section 505 citizen suit to a supplemental, abatement-oriented role, (2) the language and underlying
Congressional intent of section 505 by the Gwaltney court,

13
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and (3) sound public policy.
1. The district court correctly construed § 505 narrowly to avoid interference with the State's primary enforcement authority.
New Union joined Acme's motion below to dismiss the
pH, BOD, and TSS counts on the grounds that section 505 of
the Act does not authorize citizen suits for past violations (R.
10, n. 3). New Union does not seek to eliminate citizen suits,
buti only to limit them to the supplemental role Congress
intended. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376, 383 (1987) ("[T]he citizen suit is
meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental
action."). The plain language and statutory history of section
505 demonstrate Congress' intent to authorize citizen suits
only if the government has failed to require compliance from
permit violators. Id.; S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. at
64 (1971), reprinted in 2 A Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 1982 (1973).
Under section 505, no citizen may bring a civil action
against a permit violator if, inter alia, the state or EPA has
commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action to require compliance. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (West
1986). In states having federally-approved NPDES permit
programs, primary enforcement power rests with the State. 33
U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). Where such programs are in force, the EPA may bring enforcement action if
the state does not. Id. Both the state and the EPA possess
broad power to enforce compliance as guardians of the Act's
provisions. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (West 1986 & Supp.
1988) (authorizing administrative, civil, and criminal
sanctions).
In contrast, Congress limited the power of citizen plaintiffs. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381-82 (distinguishing § 505 from
§ 309, which grants government discretion to sue for wholly
past violations). See also 33 U.S.C.A. §_1 1365(b)(1)(A) (West
1986) (requiring citizens to give 60 days notice of intent to sue
the State, EPA, and prospective defendants); 33 U.S.C.A. §
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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1365(b)(1)(B) (West 1986) (barring citizen suit if the government undertakes enforcement action). The contrast between
section 505 and section 309 exemplifies the pervasive Congressional intent to place primary enforcement power in governmental hands and to make government inaction the sine qua
non of citizen suits.
The legislative history confirms the intent. See, e.g., S.
Rep. No. 414 at 64, 2 Leg. Hist. at 1482 ("The Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions [to] be brought
by the State."). Subsequent judicial interpretations deferred
to Congress' intent to vest primary enforcement authority in
the government through a two-tiered enforcement scheme in
which the citizen suit serves mainly as an impetus to governmental action. See, e.g., Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock
Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985); Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 652 F. Supp. 620, 625
(D.Md. 1987). See, also, Boyer and Meidinger, Privatizing
Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L.
REV.

833, 868-870 (1985).

Congress intended citizen suits to "goad the responsible
agencies to more vigorous enforcement." Proffitt v. Rohm &
Haas, 850 F.2d 1007, 1011 (3d Cir. 1988). To treat citizen suits
as a substitute for government action, as one commentatorl 9
has urged, would encourage privatization and governmental
abdication of its enforcement responsibilities. See Benson,
Clean Water Suits After Gwaltney: Applying Mootness Principles in Private Enforcement Actions, 4 J. LAND USE AND
ENVTL. L. 143, 156 (1988). Rather than encourage the government to default to private plaintiffs, Congress provided an additional "goad" to government action by allowing citizens to
sue the EPA Administrator for failure to perform non-discretionary duties. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(2) (West 1986 & Supp.
1988). Similarly, citizens have always been able to sue states
for abdication of their public trust obligation. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). The Act, however,
makes EPA suits for past violations discretionary, thus removing them from the reach of citizen plaintiffs. 33 U.S.C.A. §
1319(b) (West 1986).

15
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Concluding that Congress intended citizen suits to fill a
limited, interstitial function and not to intrude upon government's primary enforcement and administrative responsibilities, the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the scope of
section 505 suits. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383 (rejecting
citizen suits for past violations as "potentially intrusive" and
contrary to Congressional intent). The court below correctly
dismissed NCPE's pH, BOD, and TSS counts as tending to
supplant, rather than merely supplement the state's statutory
enforcement role, and similarly rejected NCPE and Acme's
attempts to intrudeL 0 upon the EPA's administrative review
role (R. 10, n.3; 11-12).
2.

Correctly applying Gwaltney in the light of the
purely supplemental function of citizen suits, the
district court properly dismissed the pH, BOD,
and TSS counts.

The court in Gwaltney based its holding that Congress
intended to authorize citizen suits only for past violations on
the purely interstitial function of section 505 suits, as well as
on other mootness and statutory interpretation grounds.
Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383 (noting the supplemental function
of § 505); 383-84 (citing plain language and legislative history); 386 (citing "longstanding principles of mootness").
The Court in Gwaltney based its findings in part upon
the statutory language of the Act. Section 505 gives citizens a
right of civil action "against any person . . . who is alleged to
be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation. . . ." 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(A)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). The Court
found that "[t]he most natural reading of 'to be in violation' is
a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either
continuous or intermittent violation - that is, a reasonable
likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the
future." Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381.
Close parallels to the citizen suit provisions of several
other environmental statutes support the Court's reading of
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section 505. Id. (citing, e.g., Resource Conservation and RecoveryL' Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. III
1985); Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). Congress expressly modeled section 505 on
the Clean Air Act, which provides solely for injunctive, abatement-oriented citizen suits. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985); see also, S. Rep. No. 414 at 79, 2 Leg. Hist. at
1497 (Section 505 modeled on Clean Air Act). Moreover, when
Congress has intended to target wholly past violations it has
said so explicitly. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381, n.2 (citing, e.g.,
"past or present" violation language in 1984 Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985).
Legislative pronouncements on section 505 also demonstrate the intent of Congress to limit citizen suits to an abatement-oriented function. Id. at 383-84; see also, Water Pollution Control Legislation Hearings Before the Subcom. on Air
and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 707 (citizen suits "are brought
for the purpose of abating pollution") (Sen. Eagleton).
Citizen suits for past violations are inconsistent with the
abatement function intended by Congress. Limiting citizen
suits to continuing violations is consistent, however, with the
supplemental nature of section 505 actions. Congress did provide for post hoc and punitive sanctions, but vested that discretionary authority solely in the government. Gwaltney, 108
S. Ct. 381-82. In contrast, section 505 provisions on standing
address present and future harm, rather than wholly past
harm._L2 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(g) (West 1986) (defining "citizen" as one possessing "an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by violations of the Act). See also, Gwaltney,
108 S. Ct. at 382. Thus, both the intended supplemental role
of citizen-plaintiffs and the intended prospective function of
section 505 suits support the limitations imposed on NCPE by
the lower court.
3.

Considerations of federalism and administrative
and judicial efficiency support limiting the scope

17
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of § 505 actions.
Sound policy considerations support limiting the role of
citizen litigators. The public interest in citizen enforcement of
water quality rules must be balanced against the public interest in federalism, orderly administrative processes, judicial efficiency, and maintenance of an economically viable distribution of the costs of improved water quality. The balance
struck by Congress, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
relegates citizen enforcement to an interstitial role and requires dismissal of section 505 suits if a defendant reasonably
achieves reliable compliance before trial. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct.
at 386 (dictum).
The statutory scheme of the Act delegates significant authority to the EPA and the States. Congress set forth the
broad purpose of the Act as being "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West Supp. 1988). To achieve
those broad goals, section 301(a) makes unlawful any discharge of any pollutant into navigable waters except as specifically2 3 authorized. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (West 1986); see
also, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988) (establishing a federal state NPDES system to authorize restricted pollutant discharges). Thus, in common with much contemporary
legislation, Congress established broad national goals and delegated the authority to set specific requirements on a case-bycase basis to an administrative body. E.g., 3 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Text, 34-35 (1972). Such authority, involving the concrete realization of policy goals through enforceable rules, is largely legislative. Id. at 11-12. Given the
technical and economic complexities involved, much environmental legislation could prove impossible without such administrative delegation of quasi-legislative authority.
Premature resort to the courts by citizen-plaintiffs
threatens the orderly functioning of the administrative process. Even absent legislation expressly granting initial jurisdiction to an agency, courts generally allow the legislative
functions of administrative bodies to run their intended
course by applying the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
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exhaustion of administrative remedies. E.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952). Congress demonstratea a similar intent to prevent disruption of the orderly
functioning of the Clean Water Act's administrative process
by requiring prior notice of intent to file a citizen suit. 33
U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (West 1986).
Considerations of federalism implicit in the Act also support a limited role for citizen-plaintiffs. The Act envisions-L
a state-federal partnership in establishing, investigating, and
enforcing NPDES discharge limitations. E.g., 33 U.S.C.A. §
1342(b) (West 1986) (authorizing states to establish and administer permit programs in conformance with federal guidelines and subject to EPA approval); 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1319,
1342(b)(7) (West 1986) (subjecting state permit holders to
both state and federal enforcement action). Thus, the Act reflects the traditional, primary role of states as owners of inland water resources and as trustees of the public interest in
navigable waters. Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
212, 230 (1845) (state title under equal footing doctrine); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53, 458 (1892)
(public trust doctrine).
Under the Act, states retain much of their traditional authority to balance competing interests in water resources. Section 303 generally entrusts to the states determination of the
specific uses designated for a body of water. 33 U.S.C.A. §
1313 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). States necessarily balance
competing interests in making that determination. Similarly,
states must balance competing interests in apportioning the
burden of achieving water quality goals by establishing enforceable NPDES discharge limitations on a case-by-case basis. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1312. (West 1986 & Supp.
1988). Congress implicitly recognized the practical necessity of
accommodating competing interests to achieve a workable
water quality plan in allowing NPDES and other specified exceptionsl1 5 to the Act's broad, no-pollution goal. 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1311 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). Moreover, the EPA has
never regarded 100 percent compliance with discharge limits
as a feasible goal. H.R. Rep. No. 189, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 33
(1985) (well-operated plants may be expected to exceed limits
19
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1 - 5 percent of the time). Whereas the Act vests discretion to
sue for past violations in the government, citizen suits for
wholly past violations would interfere with government flexibility to the long-term detriment of a workable clean water
program. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383.
The Court in Gwaltney warned of the possibility that citizen suits for past violations could interfere with the administrative discretion essential to an effective clean water program. Id. (The Court hypothesized an agreement by which a
permittee agreed to undertake corrective actions in exchange
for a governmental pledge to forego other enforcement action.
A section 505 plaintiff then filed suit, upsetting the agreement
and delaying the corrective action.) Similarly, the district
court noted and rejected attempts by both NCPE and Acme
to turn this case into a vehicle for an "end run" around the
orderly functioning of the established administrative process
for permit challenges (R. 11, 12). Indeed, NCPE's attempt to
challenge the current limitations is closely analogous to the
Gwaltney hypothetical. In both instances, an overzealous citizen-plaintiff seeks to constrain the sound exercise of administrative discretion in achieving compliance without pursuing
established-L 6 administrative remedies (R. 11). The Court in
Gwaltney wisely criticized, and the court below correctly rejected, such an approach.
Finally, citizen suits for past violations would threaten judicial efficiency. To allow citizens to sue for violations months
or years after compliance could result in a barrage of litigation
that would clog the courts without advancing any present
public interest. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 n.27 (1981). Thus,
government enforcement of the Act constitutes sound public
policy. In limiting NCPE's suit to Acme's continuing violations, consistent with Gwaltney and its predecessors, the district court furthered the long-term public interest in improved
water quality. See, e.g., Hamker v. Diamond Shamrock Chem.
Co., 756 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1985); Pautuxet Cove Marina, Inc.
v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089 (1st Cir. 1986).
B. NCPE's suit for pH, BOD, and TSS violations
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contravenes New Union's statutory role as the
primary enforcer of the Clean Water Act.
The plain language, legislative history, and judicial interpretations of the Act all support the conclusion that section 505 citizen suits play a supplemental role in the enforcement of the Act's compliance provisions. The Act's two-tiered
enforcement scheme, however, necessarily presupposes that
governmental compliance efforts are appropriate only when a
violation actually has occurred, and that citizen suits properly
can fulfill their function as an impetus to governmental action117 only when governmental action is required. A threshold question, therefore, is whether the Act's enforcement provisions obligated New Union to seek compliance by Acme.
Under the Act, a "violation" would occur if Acme were to
discharge its wastewater in contravention of the "conditon[s]
or limitations" of its NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a)(1)
(West 1986). See also, 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a) (1987) (Any permit noncompliance constitutes a violation of the Clean Water
Act and is grounds for enforcement action.). Thus, NCPE
could maintain a citizen suit under section 505 only if (1)
Acme were in violation of its current NPDES permit and (2)
New Union failed to bring the company into compliance with
that permit. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(b)(1)(B) (West 1986).
Acme, however, is not in violation of its current NPDES permit. NCPE cannot commence an action against Acme consistent with the enforcement provisions of the citizen suit, when
New Union cannot fulfill its primary enforcement role.
1. Acme is not in violation of the pH limitation in
its current NPDES permit.
Acme's current NPDES permit was issued in July, 1987
(R. 4). The new permit maintained the pH limitation established by Acme's previous permit (Range: 6-9), and Acme has
complied with that limitation since 1985, when it installed an
automatically operated lime addition system (R. 10). The
lower court noted that only one violation has occurred
since2 8 1985, that the violation was caused by extraneous
events unlikely to recur, and that NCPE's claim of pH viola21
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tions is clearly moot (R. 10). Although the court determined
that it did not need to reach the question of whether the sole
pH violation constituted an "upset" under 40 C.F.R. §
122.41(n), the court's decision to disregard the aberrant event
is consistent with the congressional intent apparent in provisions like the "upset defense": the focus of the Act is to prevent continuing violations of NPDES permits. See, e.g.,
Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. 376. The lower court correctly held that
NCPE's claim of pH violations is moot.
2.

Acme is not in violation of the BOD and TSS
limitation in its current NPDES permit.

The 1987 permit increased the limits on permissible BOD
and TSS discharges. The new limit for BOD is 1500 pounds
per day, with a 750 pounds per day average. The new limit for
TSS is 1800 pounds per day, with a 900 pounds per day
monthly average (R. 5). Acme has consistently met the standards of its current NPDES permit regarding these limitations (R. 10). In accordance with the enforcement provisions
of the Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319, Acme is not in violation of the
limitations or conditions of its current NPDES permit and,
neither New Union nor the EPA is presently under an obligation to enforce compliance. As with the claim of pH violations,
NCPE's claims of BOD and TSS violations are moot, and the
lower court correctly dismissed them.-L"
3.

The lower court's dismissal of NCPE's claims is
not affected by the organization's permit challenges pending before the EPA.

The propriety of the lower court's decision is not affected
by a challenge, currently before the EPA, in which NCPE
questions the validity of the BOD and TSS limitations in
Acme's permit. In its challenge, NCPE claims that the EPA
acted in contravention of section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §
1342, by increasing the amount of effluent Acme may discharge, that the new limits are invalid, and that the older limits, therefore, remain in effect (R. 11).
The "antibacksliding" provisions of section 402(o) are the
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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focus of NCPE's attack on the new effluent limitations. Although these provisions prevent the states and the EPA from
issuing permits with effluent limitations that are more lenient
than those found in earlier permits, several notable exceptions
are included in the section. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(o)(2)
(West Supp. 1988). One of these exceptions allows the state
and the EPA to establish less stringent guidelines if "information is available which was not available at the time of permit
issuance ... and which would have justified the application of

a less stringent effluent limitation at the time of permit issuance." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(o)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1988).
The increased BOD and TSS limitations in the Acme permit (although still more stringent than those required by the
Act) resulted from new information that other BOD and TSS
discharges into the Fairwater River had ceased (R. 5). New
Union determined that it could allow Acme to increase the
amount of the company's12 ° BOD and TSS discharges, while
continuing to maintain the State's commitment to keeping
Fairwater River safe for sport fishing, boating, swimming and
use by migratory fowl (R. 3, 5). Given the purpose of the
Clean Water Act, such a conclusion seems well within the prerogative of the State to determine and administer water quality standards for its rivers.'
The questions presented by NCPE's challenge, however,
are not before this court, but properly will be decided by the
EPA in a full adjudicatory hearing. See 40 C.F.R. § 124
(1987). In any event, the outcome of that hearing is not dispositive of the question before this court. At issue in this ap1. Section 402 apparently would allow the state to introduce less stringent standards based on the "new information" exception only in the following situation:
Where the cumulative effect of a revised waste load allocation results in a decrease in
the amount of pollutants being discharged into the waters covered by the allocation
and the revised waste load allocation is not the result of a discharger eliminating or
substantially reducing its discharge pollutants due to complying with the requirements of the Clean Water Act or for reasons unrelated to water quality. 33 U.S.C.A. §
1342(o)(2) (West Supp. 1988). Due to the lack of information in the record regarding
why the additional BOD and TSS discharges ceased, determining whether the Acme
permit is affected by this restriction is difficult. The question, however, is not before
this court, but rather will be determined by the permit challenge pending before the
EPA.
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peal is whether the lower court correctly dismissed NCPE's
claims of pH, BOD, and TSS violations. The dismissal was
correct simply because under the provisions of the Act, Acme
is not in violation of its current NPDES permit. Even assuming arguendo that the EPA determines that the State raised
Acme's discharge limitations in contravention of section 402,
the Act's compliance-2 1 scheme would dictate that a citizen
suit would be appropriate only after New Union and the EPA
failed to enforce compliance of any revised effluent limitations. To allow a citizen suit before that time would denigrate
the purpose of the Act.
C.

NCPE's claims of pH, BOD, and TSS violations
should be dismissed because the organizationfails to
make an allegation of continuous or intermittent
ongoing violations.

Under the provisions of the Clean Water Act, private citizens may commence an action against any person "who is alleged to be in violation of" an effluent standard or limitation
established pursuant to the Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(1)
(West 1986 & Supp. 1988). This language implies that citizens
may sue only for ongoing violations of the Act. The provision's
plain language and subsequent judicial interpretations of the
section 505 citizen suit provision confirm this conclusion.
A review of other environmental legislation, as well as
other provisions of the Act, demonstrates that Congress intended the citizen suit to be used only to abate ongoing violations. For example, in the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1988), Congress, inter
alia, granted citizens the authority to sue any person who
"has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal" of
hazardous waste. In addition, numerous statements in the
Clean Water Act's legislative history reflect Congress' intent
that citizen suits would serve a prospective, abatement-oriented purpose. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Legislation
HearingsBefore the_2 2 Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong.,
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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1st Sess. 114 (1971) (citizen may sue "to abate a violation")
(staff analysis), id. at 707 (citizen suits "are brought for the
purpose of abating pollution") (Sen. Eagleton). That the Act
expressly grants much broader enforcement powers (including
the right to commence actions for past violations) to the
states and the EPA Administrator than are available in the
corresponding citizen enforcement provisions also suggests
that the citizen's role is limited to abating ongoing violations
of the Act. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(a) (West 1986).
Judicial interpretations of the Act also uniformly agree
that the plain language of the citizen suit provision indicates
Congressional intent to limit this portion of the Clean Water
Act to ongoing violations. See, e.g., Hamker v. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985) (Plain
language of the statute requires an ongoing violation.); Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089,
1092 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. granted 107 S.Ct. 872 (1987) (If
Congress had intended to give citizens the right to sue for
past violations, it easily could have worded the provision to
grant such a right.)
If any ambiguity remained after these successively consistent interpretations of the Act, the United States Supreme
Court dispelled all doubts in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987). In
Gwaltney, the Court held a citizen may not maintainl 2 3 a suit
for wholly past violations of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 386.
Rather, the citizen must make a good faith allegation of a continuous or intermittent ongoing violation. Id. at 381. NCPE's
allegations of pH, BOD, and TSS violations, however, are
based on neither continuous nor intermittent violations and
under the Gwaltney standard, therefore, are moot. Consistent
with the Court's discussion in Gwaltney, Acme has challenged
the sufficiency of NCPE's complaint through its motion for
summary judgment. Id.
The Court in Gwaltney did not define the scope of a
"continuous" violation; however, the term presumably is selfexplanatory. An "intermittent" violation occurs when a permit holder exceeds the permit limitation one month out of
every three. Gwaltney at 384. The effect of these two terms is
25
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to make "a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future" an indispensable element of
every section 505 suit.
1. Acme has not continuously or intermittently violated the pH limitations in its NPDES permit.
Acme consistently has complied with the pH limitation in
its NPDES permit. Although all parties agree that until June
of 1985 Acme violated its pH limitation approximately thirty
percent of the time, these violations ceased when the company
installed a mechanized, computer-operated lime addition system to neutralize the pH effluent (R. 6). Since the system was
installed, Acme has violated the effluent limit only once.12 4
The violation resulted from a power outage which caused the
system to fail. This event lasted only six hours (R. 7).
To maintain its claim that Acme "is in violation" of the
pH limitation in its NPDES permit, NCPE must allege in
good faith that the company continuously or intermittently
violates that limitation. Given the sole six-hour violation,
NCPE simply cannot allege in good faith that a reasonable
likelihood exists that future pH violations will occur. As the
lower court correctly held, "[c]learly the case is moot as to pH
violations" (R. 10).
2.

Acme has not continuously or intermittently violated the BOD and TSS limitations in its
NPDES permit.

For NCPE to commence a citizen suit against Acme for
BOD and TSS violations, it must allege in good faith that the
company continuously or intermittently violates those limitations. Gwaltney at 383. For NCPE to maintain its action,
however, "longstanding principles of mootness" require that a
reasonable expectation must exist that the wrong will be repeated. Id. at 386 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). This requirement thus prevents citizens from contravening the Act's intent by maintaining suits
that are not concerned with ongoing violations of effluent limitations. The lower court correctly dismissed NCPE's claims
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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of BOD and TSS violations because the facts of the case
clearly indicate that the allegedly wrongful behavior cannot
reasonably be expected to recur. See id.
Acme consistently has met the BOD and TSS effluentL2 5
limitations in its NPDES permit since the permit was issued
in 1987 (R. 10). In addition, the company has demonstrated
that its effluent discharges have been consistent with those
limitations since 1986 (R. 10). During a two week period each
winter, however, the company's discharges exceeded the permit limitations because extreme cold causes biological activity
in the treatment system to diminish (R. 8).
Given these facts, NCPE maintains that Acme is a violator of the Clean Water Act. The organization's claims, however, simply do not meet the standards discussed in
Gwaltney. Acme clearly is not a "continuous" violator of the
Act: The company currently is in compliance with its permit
limitations. For Acme to be an intermittent violator it must
exceed its effluent limitations once a month out of every three.
Although the company is unable to meet the permit limitations for a two week period every winter, these aberrations
clearly do not meet the "intermittent" violation threshold. As
the lower court correctly noted: "The fact that extremely cold
weather - an act of God - interferes with the proper function-

ing of Acme's treatment system on an occasional basis does
not demonstrate that the earlier violations continue" (R. 11).
The dismissal of NCPE's claims was proper under the
Gwaltney decision, and the validity of the court's ruling is not
undermined by factual variations between Gwaltney and this
case. Specifically, although the defendant in Gwaltney
achieved compliance prior to the filing of the citizen suit while
Acme 22 achieved compliance after filing but before trial, the
basis for the Gwaltney decision indicates that this variation
alone cannot allow NCPE to maintain its claims. See
Gwaltney at 379-80. Because the Court in Gwaltney premised
its decision on the finding that Congress intended to authorize
citizen suits only in cases of continuous or intermittent violations, the Court's suggestion that section 505 suits become
moot if a defendant achieves compliance after filing but
before trial necessarily follows from an application of the
27
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Gwaltney rule. Id. at 386. The lower court properly dismissed
NCPE's counts alleging BOD and TSS violations as moot on
grounds that those violations are not continuing violations as
required to maintain a section 505 action.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO RULE ON ACME'S CHALLENGE TO THE CERTIFICATION AND TOXICITY EFFLUENT LIMITATION
BECAUSE
THE
COURT
LACKED
JURISDICTION.

The district court's rejection of Acme's challenge to the
toxicity limitation's validity is supported by the long-standing
judicial doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Act provisions allowing for administrative procedures established by the EPA, and precluding judicial review of specified administrative actions in enforcement proceedings, further support the district court's
decision. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1369(b)(1) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988);
40 C.F.R. § 124.74(a) (1987).-L7
A.

Judicial intervention into the validity of Acme's
NPDES permit conditions is unwarranted because
Acme failed to exhaust EPA remedies and processes.

The district court rejected attempts by both NCPE and
Acme to use this case as a vehicle to evade an initial EPA
decision on their respective permit challenges (R. 11, 12).
Given the broad, no-pollution purpose of the Act, the case
against such "end runs" by polluters is especially strong. 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251(a), 1311(a), and 1342 (West 1986 & Supp.
1988). In particular, Act provisions restricting review of
agency actions to the court of appeals suggest a general Congressional intent to prevent polluters from turning enforcement proceedings into forums for collateral attacks on permit
validity. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1369(b)(1) (West Supp. 1988). Thus,
application of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is consistent with Congressional intent.
Even absent clear Congressional intent to vest initial juhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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risdiction in agencies, courts generally have deferred to the
administrative process for a preliminary determination of issues within the special competence of an agency. Davis at 374,
381. Several of the reasons justifying this primary jurisdiction
doctrine were summarized by the Court in the Far East Conference case:
Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business
entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and
interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to
agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more
flexible procedures. 128
342 U.S. at 574-75.
The need to avoid conflicting court-agency pronouncements in
the distribution of the costs of meeting Clean Water Act goals
parallels the concerns addressed in Far East Conference.
The district court properly dismissed Acme's permit challenge because Acme's failure to exhaust administrative
processes should not be waived. The considerations supporting the exhaustion doctrine merge with those supporting primary jurisdiction. Davis at 394-95. A party should exhaust administrative remedies before it seeks judicial relief from an
agency decision. United Farm Workers of America AFL-CIO
v. Arizona Agri. Employment Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249,
1253 (9th Cir. 1982). The exhaustion doctrine avoids unnecessary or premature judicial intervention, id., and allows the expertise of the agency to sharpen complicated issues of technical fact. Paskavitch v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 458 F. Supp. 216, 217 (D.Conn. 1978).
EPA regulations provide that an applicant for an NPDES
permit may petition for an agency review of the final permit
at an evidentiary hearing. 40 C.F.R. § 124.74(a) (1987). Further, any denial of an evidentiary hearing may be appealed to
the EPA administrator. 40 C.F.R. § 124.91(a)(1) (1987). Acme
did not initially pursue its challenge to the toxicity limitation
before the EPA, rather Acme pursued its administrative rem29
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edies only after its initial state court challenge was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction (R. 4, 5). Thus, any urgency Acme
now_21 claims is of its own making. Judicial intervention will
be unnecessary if the EPA rules favorably on Acme's challenge. Finally, the judiciary would benefit from the more complete record available after an EPA determination.
Failure to exhaust agency remedies may be waived if appeal to a superior agency authority is not mandatory. New
England Coalition v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 582 F.2d 87, 99 (1st Cir. 1978). EPA regulations,
however, expressly provide that appeal "to the Administrator
[of the EPA] under paragraph (a) of this section for review of
any initial decision or the denial of an evidentiary hearing is,
under 5 U.S.C. § 704, a prerequisite to the seeking of judicial
review of the final decision of the Agency." 40 C.F.R. §
124.91(e) (1987). Because Acme has not yet completed the
EPA appeals process (R. 6) and EPA regulations make the
appeal mandatory, the district court properly declined to
waive Acme's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
B. Even assuming that judicial review of Acme's permit challenge was otherwise appropriate, the district court correctly dismissed the challenge because
it was brought in the wrong forum.
Congress intended that original jurisdiction to adjudicate
challenges concerning NPDES permits would be vested in
specific federal and state courts. For example, federal appel-late courts have jurisdiction over effluent limitations and state
courts have jurisdiction over section 401 certifications.
1. Acme must bring its challenge to the toxicity effluent limitation in the federal court of
appeals. 21
The Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to hear Acme's challenge to the toxicity effluent limitation promulgated by the EPA. Courts of appeal have
exclusive jurisdiction to review EPA actions enumerated in
section 509(b)(1) of the Act. Central Hudson Gas and Elec.
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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Corp. v. Environmental ProtectionAgency, 587 F.2d 549, 555
(2d Cir. 1978). Administrator action "in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section
1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345 of this title" is reviewable in the
court of appeals. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1369(b)(1)(E) (West. Supp.
1988). This provision undeniably confers original jurisdiction
on the court of appeals to review EPA-promulgated effluent
limitations for existing point sources under 22 U.S.C. §311.
E.I.du Pont. be Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 137
(1977). The Act requires that NPDES permits include "any
more stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet
water quality standards . . . established pursuant to any
State law or regulations (under authority preserved by section
1370 of the title) . . . ." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (West
1986); see United Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 835 (7th
Cir. 1977). An existing point source means "any discernible,
confined, and discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants
are or may be discharged." 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1987). The EPA
promulgated Acme's toxicity effluent limitation to implement
New Union's narrative water quality standard (R. 4). Because
Acme discharges pollution into Fairwater River (R. 1), its facility 121 is an existing point source. Under these circumstances, the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to review the toxicity effluent limitation in Acme's NPDES permit.
The district court properly held that it lacked jurisdiction to
hear Acme's challenge.
2.

New Union's certification of Acme's NPDES permit should be reviewed only by the agencies and
courts of New Union.

The courts and agencies of New Union have original jurisdiction to review the Department's certification of Acme's
permit. The purpose of state certification, 13 U.S.C. § 1341, is
to insure that the EPA and other federal agencies do not override state water quality standards. S. Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
3735. If the state or its agency denies certification, the EPA
may not issue an NPDES permit "unless the State action was
31
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overturned in the appropriate courts of jurisdiction." Id. The
state court is the proper forum to review state certification.
Roosevelt Campobello Internat'l Park Comm'n v. Environmental Protection Agency, 684 F.2d 1041, 1056 (1st Cir.
1984); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 426 F. Supp. 230, 235 (S.D.
Ala. 1976). The EPA also recognizes that review of limitations
set forth by a state pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1341 "shall be
made through the applicable procedures of the state . . . ." 40
C.F.R. § 124.55(e) (1987). The courts and agencies of New
Union have jurisdiction to adjudicate Acme's challenge to the
certification. Dismissal by a lower state court, as in this case
(R. 5), for lack\ of jurisdiction is a 2 ' final judgment which
may be appealed to a higher state court. See Melory v. Saint
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 72 Ariz. 406, 407, 236 P.2d 732, 733
(1951) (A judgment dismissing an action is a final decision
and therefore an appealable judgment). Furthermore, Acme
may use any available Department procedures for review of
the certification and its process.
3.

The district court should have abstained from
adjudicating Acme's challenge to New Union's
water quality standard even if it had jurisdiction
because this controversy concerns a sensitive area
of New Union social policy.

Assuming, arguendo, that the district court had jurisdiction over some part of Acme's challenge to New Union's water
quality standard, the court should have abstained from adjudicating this controversy. Federal courts should abstain from
deciding NPDES permit controversies concerning state laws
or political questions if state avenues for review are available.
See Mobil Oil, 426 F. Supp. at 235. In Railroad Comm'n of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498-99 (1941), the Court
set forth the criteria for federal abstention: (1) the challenge
regards a sensitive area of state social policy which federal
courts should not enter unless alternative review is unavailable, (2) a ruling on the state issue may resolve the federal
question, and (3) proper interpretation of the state law is uncertain. Where the suit involves possible disruption of comhttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6

32

INTERVENOR BRIEF

1989]

plex state administrative processes, all three Pullman elements are not required. See Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315 (1943). New Union's legislature carefully balanced the economic and 2 3 recreational benefits derived from
the use of Fairwater River and determined that the river
should be available for general recreational purposes (R. 2).
The Department, a state administrative body, promulgated
the more stringent toxicity limitation as a condition to its certification of Acme's NPDES permit (R. 4). Presumably, the
state court dismissed Acme's challenge for primary jurisdictional reasons (R. 5). A Department or New Union court ruling on state constitutional grounds could resolve Acme's challenge. The proper interpretation and application of New
Union's water quality standard should be determined by the
state court or Department. All the Pullman elements therefore apply.
Congress, under the Act, envisioned a federal partnership
with the traditional state and tribal guardians of the public
trust in inland waters. See supra p. 10. Abstention similarly
respects federal principles and accords with the general Clean
Water Act enforcement scheme intended by Congress.
C.

Because undisputed DMRs evidence Acme's violations of the enforceable toxicity effluent limitation,
the district court properly granted the NCPE-New
Union motion for partial summary judgment.

The district court correctly granted NCPE's summary
judgment motion on the unrebutted evidence contained in the
DMRs that Acme continuously violated the toxicity effluent
limitation.
1. Acme's DMRs properly constitute admissions for
purposes of summary judgment.
Acme's DMRs evidence violations of the toxicity limitation for each of the twelve monthly reporting periods since
issuance_24 of Acme's current permit (R. 9, 12), and constitute admissions sufficient to support NCPE's motion for par33
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tial summary judgment. The Act requires NPDES permit
holders to submit DMRs of pollution discharges to EPA on a
regular basis. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.21(f), (g), 122.44(i) (1987); 33
U.S.C.A. § 1318 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). DMRs are based
on required effluent tests conducted by the permittee. Id.
Acme's NPDES permit requires monthly toxicity DMRs (R.
9). DMRs showing that discharges exceeded permit levels are
proof of permit limitation violations and, absent an adequate
defense, constitute admissions for summary judgment purposes. Student Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D.N.J.
1985); see also, Thomas, Citizen Suits and the NPDES Program: A Review of Clean Water Act Decisions, 17 Envtl. L.
Rep. 10050 - 10052 (1987) (summarizing numerous examples
of DMRs so used). Acme has not disputed that it has violated
the permit toxicity limitation on each of the several occasions
it conducted the required testing (R. 11). Assuming that the
NPDES permit limitation is valid, Acme's DMRs constitute
unrebutted admissions for summary judgment purposes and
sufficiently support the district court's order.
2.

Pending administrative review of Acme's permit
challenge and possible subsequent judicial review, Acme's current permit limitations are binding and enforceable.

The district court properly granted partial summary
judgment on NCPE's claim because the existing permit limitations remain active and enforceable pending the outcome of
Acme's permiti23 challenge before the EPA. The court's role
in section 505 actions is limited to a determination of whether
Act provisions requiring compliance with existing permit discharge limits have been violated. Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. P. D. Oil & Chemical
Storage, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1074, 1083 (D.N.J. 1986). Acme
undisputedly has failed to comply with existing permit toxicity limitations (R. 12). Moreover, Acme's challenge substantially relates to New Union's water quality standard, rather
than the discharge limitations upon which enforcement action
https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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is based. See infra p. 36. Indeed, only if a polluter holds an
NPDES permit authorizing discharges or falls within other
specific statutory exemptions is the pollution lawful under the
Act. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (West 1986). The absence of final
administrative or judicial action on a challenged permit does
not give a polluter a license to pollute indefinitely. Proffitt,
850 F.2d at 1013 (section 505 action to enforce limitation not
properly dismissed despite EPA stay pending validity challenge); Monsanto, 600 F. Supp. at 1483 ("Pendency of a modification proceeding does not excuse violations of a permit
prior to actual modification."). The district court, therefore,
correctly found Acme's existing NPDES permit limitations to
be enforceable and properly granted NCPE's summary judgment motion.
a.

The district court correctly granted NCPE's motion because the toxicity limitation is an "effluent
limitation" within the meaning of § 301 of the
Act._26

Effluent challenge limitations are the basis for permit enforcement under the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments. 33
U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (West 1986); Environmental Protection Agency v. State Water Resources Control Board, 426
U.S. 200, 204-05 (1976) (Amended Act focuses on tolerable
discharges measured by technology-based effluent limitations
to achieve its purposes). The 1972 Amendments substituted
permit effluent limitations for collective water quality standards as the keystone of the Act. Trustees for Alaska v. Environmental Protection Agency, 749 F.2d 549, 556-57 (9th Cir.
1984) ("Effluent limitations are a means of achieving water
quality standards.") (Emphasis in original); see also S. Rep.
No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 5, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3675 ("Under this Act the basis of pollution prevention and elimination will be the application of
effluent limitations. Water quality will be a measure of program effectiveness and performance and not a means of elimination and enforcement."). Much or all of Acme's validity
challenge relies on procedural and vagueness objections to the
35
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State's narrative water quality standard (R. 4, 5). Acme presumably does not suggest that the 96 hour in situ bio-assay
limitation is a collective water quality standard, rather than a
technical measure of discharge effects (See R. 4). The toxicity
effluent limitation, not the water quality standard, is the basis
for enforcing Acme's permit. Therefore, the district court
properly granted NCPE's summary judgment motion._1j7
b.

Because the toxicity limitation is a condition
in Acme's NPDES permit, it must be enforced by the EPA.

The EPA must enforce the toxicity limitation in Acme's
permit even if New Union's certification were procedurally defective. To achieve Congressional objectives, any certification
under section 1341 must establish effluent limitations that become a condition to the NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(d)
(West 1986). Furthermore, absent state certification, the EPA
must enforce effluent limitations established pursuant to state
law that are more stringent than federal limitations set forth
in 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)(1)(C). Roosevelt Campobello, 684
F.2d at 1056. New Union established the toxicity limitation to
implement its narrative water quality standards (R. 4). The
toxicity limitation is now an enforceable condition to Acme's
permit with which Acme must comply or face the sanctions
provided by the Act.
D.

If this court reverses the district court, it should remand the case because the delay will not adversely
affect the public, the parties have not fully briefed
and argued the merits, and justice will not be served
by considering issues not reached by the district
court.

If the court reverses the district court, it should remand
the case for further proceedings on the merits. The better
practice is to remand rather than to reach the merits. Abbott
Laboratoriesv. Gardner,387 U.S. 136, 156 (1967). Exceptions
to the practice may be made if the following criteria are met:
(1) no issues of fact remain, (2) all parties seek summary judghttps://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/6
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ment, (3) the parties have fully briefed and argued the issues,
(4) delay may adversely affect the public, and (5)-28 justice
requires consideration of issues not reached by the lower
court. Central Hudson Gas v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 587 F.2d 549, 557-58 (2d Cir. 1978).
The first two criteria are met: no parties dispute that
Acme consistently violated the toxicity limitation (R. 12) and
all parties moved for summary judgment (R. 2). The last three
criteria, however, have not been met. Briefs are limited to full
argument of only those issues contained in Order No. 88-1001,
dated September 15, 1988, by Chief Judge B. M. Romulus.
New Union citizens will benefit directly from enforcement of
the toxicity limitation, which will make Fairwater River safe
for swimming, sport fishing, and boating (R. 3). Finally, justice is served when polluters litigate on their own time and
with their own money. Train v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, 421 U.S. 60, 92 (1975).
CONCLUSION
Upon the facts and law presented, Intervenor respectfully
requests that the judgment of the District Court for the District of New Union be affirmed.
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